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1 Introduction
With reduced or even negative growth in the goods and services economy in many countries and
debt levels which become an increasing burden on developed societies, the calls for a change in
economic policy and even the monetary system become louder and increasingly impatient.
∗This research has been done at Dublin City University. The author gratefully acknowledges the Science
Foundation Ireland (Edgeworth Center and FMC2) for their support.
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We research the consequences of a system of credit and debt, that still allows for the expansion
of credit and fundamentally retains many features of the present monetary system, without the
instability inherent in the present system. Many alternative systems have been proposed. Our
approach rest on the concept of productivity share promises. The motivating example in (2)
and its issues give rise to the concept of the productivity numeraire (3). We will describe the
implementation we have in mind in the following sections (4) and (5). We extend the concept to
services (6) and to private credits (7). In section (8) we explain how government bonds would
be issued in this system. Briefly we discuss how interbank lending would have to be handled to
prevent instabilities in (9). We then move on to discuss the effect such a model might have on
the term structure of interest rates, represented by the HJM equation (10). The relation to the
HJM condition allows to formulate a no arbitrage condition based on an economic growth model
(11) . The implications of our approach are summarized in (12) before we reach our conclusions
in (13).
A good source for the mathematics used here is the book by Bjo¨rk [1].
2 Motivation
A historical way of handling interest based on productivity is the following:
A creditor lends the debtor 10 units of currency. The debtor produces goods worth those 10
units of currency to repay the loan and additionally goods worth a further unit of currency for
interest. These goods (sold or not) belong to the creditor who has been repaid and received
interest.
Of course the problem here is, that the future market value St of the produced goods (let us
count them in a process Nt) is unknown. Therefore it may become impossible to even repay the
original loan.
For that reason, one might look for a way of bringing promises more into line with what can
reasonably well be predicted about the future.
3 The Productivity Numeraire
Given an activity to produce objects or deliver services, we can measure the productivity of the
activity in terms of the number of goods produced or the number of services delivered. This will
then be a positive process (depending on the way this is measured it may not be integer valued)
and for reasonable modeling assumptions a semimartingale. We denote this numeraire as (Nt)t.
Let Πm
n
denote the productivity measured in Nt .
4 Credit On Material Productivity
The most central element of a sustainable way of giving credit, is to tie the interest to the
productivity of the enterprise financed by the credit. The simplest example is a credit to an
enterprise where goods are to be produced.
The successful borrower will lead the enterprise, while the bank finances the cost of setting up
the enterprise and gets to check (but not decide) on the practice of the enterprise if it desires.
Let the cost of the enterprise to be setup be C (let environmental costs be included in this) in
the currency of the 2 partners.
We want to think of the enterprise in terms of money and in terms of productivity, so we need 2
numeraires: Nt as described above and St as price process of the produced goods and services.
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We may assume any type of model for the evolution of the change of numeraire (Nt
St
)t, which
is just the market price of the amount of goods (or services) N . That allows to calculate the
expected repayment rate at rate rt:
rprm
n
T =
1
E[Πm
n
T −Πm−1
n
T ]
E(
C
n
Nm
n
T
Sm
n
T
). (1)
Here T is the time horizon for repayment and n is the number of time steps in which the
repayment is to occur. Thus rprt is the expected part of the production that will allow us to
repay the given sum C in n total steps. The expectation is fixed at time 0, so the producer
knows the exact number at the time the loan is agreed on and is not subject to ”unexpected”
price developments of his enterprise St
Nt
. That risk has to be carried by the bank and it might
result in unexpected gains as well as losses.
A total sum of
Π =
n∑
m=1
rprm
n
T (Πm
n
T −Πm−1
n
T ) (2)
in productive results has been accrued to cover just the loan. The market value depends on the
agreed on selling procedure but will typically be
A =
n∑
m=1
rprm
n
T (Πm
n
T −Πm−1
n
T )
Sm
n
T
Nm
n
T
. (3)
meaning the product is always sold on the market right away. (Other options may be considered
in the future).
An additional interest paying period I with m payments will generally be agreed on. The interest
fraction rI should be considerably lower than the repayment fraction rpr. The total interest will
then be
J =
n∑
m=1
rIm
n
I(Πm
n
I −Πm−1
n
I)
Sm
n
I
Nm
n
I
. (4)
Thus, the total sum repayed for the investment C will be
E = A+ J. (5)
5 Default And Loss
What happens, if the sum C is bigger than E? Obviously the bank has financed more than the
fraction of the productive results of the enterprise could repay when sold on the market. In that
case, as with any bad bet, the bank has to accept the losses. There can be no ownership of
productive assets or any enterprises by the bank.
The bank will take a loss of
C − E. (6)
That loss has to be covered by the banks wealth.
A more difficult situation occurs, if the enterprise fails altogether and production stops or the
enterprise does not abide by good standards of conduct (diverts funds, willfully stops producing
etc). In that case, the bank will have to deal with the local authorities. If there is an interest
to continue the enterprise this can be organized locally and the loan continues, possibly with an
negotiated extension.
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If there is no interest by the local authorities to continue the enterprise the bank has 2 more
options. It can suggest a private investor which can continue the enterprise and the loan if the
local authorities agree. Otherwise it must dismantle every unused element of the enterprise and
every reusable element of the enterprise must be sold by the bank at the market and the obtained
sum will be credited to the bank. All other elements (including the costs of dismantling) will
have to be paid for by the bank.
How much may the bank lend? Basically, we assume a fractional lending system remains in
place. But the lent money will have to show up in the banks balance. The total ratio of given
credit to deposits for any given bank must be official and every depositor has to be informed
regularly of this ratio.
6 Credit For (Paid) Services
Of course we want to fund services as well. It is sometimes hard to find a market value for those,
but if they are being paid for, we can formulate the loan in terms of hourly pay as productivity.
Other than that everything applies as above with the qualification that there will usually not
be as many possibilities to obtain money from a failed service enterprise as from a production
enterprise.
7 Credit For Private Persons
Of course things get more complicated when extending credit to private customers, who might
for instance want to build a house or finance higher education. The basic principle must stay
the same: Payments can only come from real produced wealth and a bank must not own real
assets. Directly or indirectly.
Thus, for the housing example, we can take the present income. The bank is promised a fixed
fraction of the borrowers income, working or otherwise. The borrower promises to keep the
agreed on income sources flowing (usually this will be a pledge to work), otherwise the case will
be considered to be a default. Legal provisions as to when this is the case will be crucial. A
normal job loss will certainly not qualify as a default.
Apart from that, whatever the income development of the borrower, the bank can not claim more
money than the agreed on fraction and has no rights over the house or the way of education
chosen by the borrower, except in a willful default.
The education example could be an agreement on a start of repayments after the education.
The implications of the obligations on the borrower are thus much easier to understand for the
borrower, making it much easier to reach a reasonable decision on whether to take up a loan or
not.
8 Government Bonds
In such a system, it would be much more natural for the government to issue bonds on a fraction
of its future economic output. A zero coupon bond, promising the buyer 1 percent of the states
tax revenue over the time span [t, T ] would be worth
Bp(t, T ) =
1
100
τ(t)e(
∫
T
t
fp(t,s)ds) (7)
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where Bp(t, T ) is the price of the bond, (τ(t))t is the state tax income process and fp(t, T ) is
the growth rate of tax revenue (which may be negative) of the tax generating economy. The
big advantage being, that this relates the bond to real tax income and the rate fp(t, T ) can be
observed empirically, through the tax intake.
In terms of expectations of the lenders we can define
Γ(t, T ) =
1
ELenders(θ(t, T )))
. (8)
Differently said, this is the share of state income over the time span [t, T ] the lenders demand to
owe 1 unit of currency and thus a good measure of trust in the states economy.
9 Inter Bank Lending
A loan between 2 banks is determined as with any other enterprise. There is an expectation
on the performance of the banks projects and then money can be lend to the usual terms of
repayment fractions and interest.
However there is one big extra provision: that money must not be used as deposit to base new
loans on, but only as credit sum to directly fund projects. Liability is first in the hands of the
receiving bank. If that bank collapses the lending bank is fully liable. Deposits must not be
transfered without direct consent by the account holders at any given time (no general consent
is possible). They must never be used to issue loans in other banking institutes.
10 The Heath-Jarrow-Morton Analogue In A Sustainable
Credit World
The HJM equation for the forward rate process f(t, T ) is given through
df(t, T ) = α(t, T )dt+ σ(t, T )TdW ∗t +
∫
Rr
δ(t, x, T )(µ− ν∗)(dt, dx) (9)
See Appendix for a detailed explanation The form of the equation needs not change. To see
what happens to the forward rate, it is best to look at bonds issued by the country in terms of
productive promises. The yield here is truly ”default free” apart from the unavoidable political
risk (free decision to default without need, massive revolution).
The empirically charged bond prices actually reflect the assertion of markets of the countries
capability to run a healthy productive economy, instead of its ability to service ever growing
interest.
We get the following equation from the bond dynamics
fp(t, T ) =
∂
∂T
log(Bp(t, T )) (10)
thus the productive state economy forward rate would be equal to the negative growth rate of
the tax income of the state.
We assume this forward rate to be described by the HJM framework
dfp(t, T ) = αp(t, T )dt+ σp(t, T )
TdW ∗t +
∫
Rr
δp(t, x, T )(µ− ν
∗)(dt, dx) (11)
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so the condition for no arbitrage, given a certain dynamic model would be
Ap(t, T ) +
1
2
|Sp(t, T )|
2 +
∫
Rr
(eDp(t,xT ) − 1−Dp(t, x, T ))F (t, dx) = 0 [dP
∗ × dt] (12)
excluding existence issues for the moment.
If we assume some economic growth model to describe the drift of rp(t), we can tie the financial
concept of the forward rate dynamics to economical growth theories.
We can also use the ”lenders demand process” Γ(t, T ) to define
fΓ(t, T ) =
d
dt
log Γ(t, T ). (13)
The properties of this rate will be a subject of further study.
Those equations are infinite dimensional SDEs much like the original HJM equation. In fact, we
may model them in much the same way.
11 No Arbitrage In Sustainable Credit
Using a HJM framework for one of the related forward rates above allows to apply the HJM
framework to determine no arbitrage conditions on the forward rate. Such conditions can connect
economic and financial points of view, if we use economic models to describe rp(t) and then check
the HJM drift condition based on those models.
Assume from some growth model
dαp(t, T ) = g(t, T, αp(t, T )) (14)
then the drift condition in the HJM framework implies
∫ T
t
αp(t, s)ds = −
1
2
|Sp(t, T )|
2 −
∫
Rr
(eDp(t,xT ) − 1−Dp(t, x, T ))F (t, dx) [dP
∗ × dt] (15)
and we can calculate for instance 12 |S(t, T )|
2 for a continuous diffusion model in mathematical
finance, by using the drift taken from an economic model.
It is important to note, that this could be applied even in the present system, provided we could
define a model to give us an analog of fp(t, T ).
12 Implications Of The Model
The concept of interest based on productive activity has the advantage, that in terms of produc-
tion shares there can be no unavoidable default for a state.
It also ensures, that a states production will not end up entirely serving interest payments. Thus
the rates are first of all truly default free except for the political risk.
Any obligations in this model wear off after the agreed on time. Debt therefore grants less polit-
ical influence over state policies and private debtors. Withholding of credit of course would still
be an option, but both public pressure and the founding of new banks can likely prevent that
measure from influencing policy as much as is presently the case.
However the model is a true market model, in that it leaves both risk and reward primarily with
the investor/creditor while making ”too big to fail” type situations far less likely.
Furthermore, this model could provide a smooth transition between the present monetary system
and others, by allowing the state to become debt free or almost debt free in a reasonable time
frame.
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13 Conclusions
• The model prevents debt ratios above 100 percent of the state income and makes sure the
agreed on debt is always repayable.
• The model can be used both, in a debt based monetary system or in a system where the
state can print freely.
• The total amount of money will generally expand if there are productive activities but may
contract without causing a economic collapse.
• The HJM framework can directly link economical models of growth to financial models for
the productive forward rate and vice versa.
A HJM Framework
The HJM equation is given through
Definition 1 (HJM Framework) The following exposition is taken from [2] and gives a very
general framework.
We assume a complete stochastic basis (Ω,F ,F,P∗) satisfying the usual conditions. Then we
assume the following dynamics for the instantaneous forward rate
df(t, T ) = α(t, T )dt+ σ(t, T )TdW ∗t +
∫
Rr
δ(t, x, T )(µ− ν∗)(dt, dx) (16)
where W ∗ is a standard Brownian Motion in Rd, µ is the random measure of jumps of a semi-
martingale with continuous compensator ν∗ for which ν∗(dt, dx) = F (t, dx)dt is assumed to
hold. The coefficients are continuous in the second variable. α : Ω × [0, T ∗] × [0, T ∗] → R
and σ : Ω × [0, T ∗] × [0, T ∗] → Rd+ are assumed to be P × B([0, T
∗]) measurable and δ :
Ω × [0, T ∗] × Rr × [0, T ∗] → R is assumed to be P × B(Rr) × B([0, T ∗]) measurable. We de-
note ∆ := {(s, u) ∈ R+ × R+|0 ≤ s ≤ u ≤ T
∗}. Then
• If (t, T ) /∈ ∆ we have α(t, T ) = δ(t, x, T ) = 0 and σ(t, T ) = (0, 0, . . . , 0)T .
• For all (t, T ) ∈ ∆ there holds
∫ T
0
∫ T
t
|α(s, u)|duds <∞ (17)
∫ T
0
∫ T
t
|σ(s, u)|2duds <∞ (18)
∫ T
0
∫
R
∫ T
t
|δ(s, x, u)|2duν∗(ds, dx). (19)
• We denote
A(t, T ) := −
∫ T
t
α(t, u)du S(t, T ) := −
∫ T
t
σ(t, u)du
D(t, x, T ) = −
∫ T
t
δ(t, x, u)du
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• We get two conditions for P∗ to be a martingale measure. The first
∫ t
0
∫
Rr
eD(s,x,T ) − 1−D(s, x, T )F (s, dx)ds <∞ ∀(t, T ) ∈ ∆ (20)
• The second
A(t, T ) +
1
2
|S(t, T )|2 +
∫
Rr
(eD(t,xT ) − 1−D(t, x, T ))F (t, dx) = 0 [dP∗ × dt] (21)
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